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Introduction 
 
The thinking about development is permeated by notions of crisis, which derive from the awareness 
that there is an immense – and unacceptable – inequality in life chances between people born in 
different parts of the world (Selwyn 2014: 10-13). Many people in rich countries understand the 
development crisis in terms of a moral obligation to come to the assistance of fellow human beings 
living in poor countries. Development assistance has thus been an important component of the 
development project ever since the end of World War II (cf. McMichael 1996). 
 
It is ironic that development assistance, which has been inspired by the perceived crisis in 
development, has itself shown signs of crisis during most of its existence. Despite spending several 
trillions of USD in aid, the United Nations (2016) estimated that the number of extremely poor people 
had risen to 836 million by 2015. Seven decades after World War II ended, the adoption of the 
Sustainable Development Goals was deemed necessary to end global poverty, among other goals. 
Various observers have voiced scepticism not only about the achievements of aid in fighting global 
poverty, but also about its impact in other domains. Migration may serve as a useful example: in a 
review of research evidence accumulated over 45 years, Clemens (2014) showed that aid programmes 
and trade agreements have not curbed migration flows. Development assistance seems to have had 
almost the opposite effect from that intended because, by stimulating growth, aid practices may 
actually have stimulated migration. 
 
The perceived failure of aid to make a difference in ending poverty has led to repeated crises of 
legitimacy. At various moments over the past 70 years, critical analyses emphasizing the perverse 
effects of aid became quite popular. Writing on aid since the 1960s, development economist P.T. 
Bauer was adamant in his criticism. He claimed:   
 
Foreign aid does not affect the major factors behind the material backwardness of 
underdeveloped countries; the continued poverty of the recipient countries is therefore not 
surprising. The policies of the recipient countries have on the whole served to retard or 
obstruct possible advance. (Bauer 1966: 58) 
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Contemporary aid critics emphasize that the crisis of development assistance is inherent to the very 
notion of aid itself. A staunch critic, Dambisa Moyo, suggests that aid is caught in a vicious cycle: 
 
With aid’s help, corruption fosters corruption, nations quickly descend into a vicious cycle of 
aid… This is the … cycle that chokes off desperately needed investment, instils a culture of 
dependency, and facilitates rampant and systematic corruption, all with deleterious 
consequences for growth. The cycle that, in fact, perpetuates underdevelopment, and 
guarantees economic failure in the poorest aid-dependent countries. (Moyo 2009: 49) 
 
Not only aid sceptics, but also supporters of aid, recognise that the giving aid carries inherent risks. 
Former Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Bert Koenders, was very aware of such risks 
but emphasised that the legitimacy of development assistance should be enhanced by developing tools 
for risk management. In his policy note, Our Common Concern, Koenders suggested: 
 
Active involvement in fragile states certainly entails risks when it comes to achieving results 
and accounting for expenditure. However, neither the international community nor the 
Netherlands can afford to do nothing. The price is simply too high. This requires a flexible 
approach that allows considered risks to be taken. It is however important that risks be 
properly identified and managed as far as possible. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007: 43) 
 
This chapter reviews the permanent crisis of aid as a failure to learn from the crisis (Jessop 2015: 257). 
Instead of drawing lessons that question the legitimacy of aid, which would require a reflexive attitude 
and an analysis of deeper causes of the difficulty to address development problems, the aid industry 
usually responds to doubts regarding aid effectiveness by highlighting the symptoms of crisis and 
measures to remove them. Accounts about corruption in aid-receiving governments are normally 
approached with routinised crisis management techniques, aimed at curbing the practices of corrupt 
officials (cf. Jessop 2015: 247). Common responses include the temporary cessation of aid flows, the 
choice for different aid-delivery channels and/or the support to ‘public integrity’ agencies, but these 
generally fail to address the underlying problem.1 
 
The aid industry typically responds to development crises with new schemes that are aimed at solving 
the previous crisis. As Mosse (2011: 4) has put it very aptly, policy making on development assistance 
has become characterised by ‘a technicalization of policy and the centralization of expertise’. Based on 
their technical understandings of development issues, policy-makers focus on the symptoms of crisis, 
and typically adapt existing aid schemes to deal with emerging realities. Innovations, which reflect the 
attempt to learn about crises, remain within the parameters set by the dominant aid paradigm, and fail 
to address fundamental causes such as increasing global inequality. Accordingly, I now seek to 
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interpret the major innovations introduced into the aid architecture since the rise of the Post-
Washington Consensus in the mid-1990s (cf. Fine et al. 2003) as elements of the permanent crisis of 
aid. The innovations, embodied in projects on the Millennium and the Sustainable Development 
Goals, were responses to the legitimacy crisis that affected development assistance. The MDG and 
SDG projects can both be understood as responses by the aid community to the crisis construals 
regarding development assistance that had become influential in public debate. 
 
The Evolution of Development Aid 
 
The evolution of development aid can be interpreted in terms of the thinking about and practices in 
development policies. Although these two elements are closely interconnected, it makes sense to 
distinguish them for analytical purposes. 
 
Thinking about development 
 
The history of development thinking has often been narrated as a sequence of ‘paradigms’ or schools 
of thought. Starting at the end of the 1940s, with the advent of decolonisation, ‘development’ became 
the central feature of the policies adopted by international organisations and Western governments. 
Inspired by the success of the Marshall plan for the reconstruction of Europe, development aid was 
provided to the governments of countries in the global South. The identification of ‘gaps’ between the 
existing and desired situation in the developing world became a hallmark of development thinking. 
Early scholars, such as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), emphasised industrial investment in countries with a 
large agricultural surplus workforce as the key element of a ‘big push’ to industrialisation. This idea 
was later generalised into the persistent notion of the financing gap between required investment and 
available resources, which development assistance could help to fill and thereby contribute to 
economic growth (cf. Easterly 1999). Other scholars offered their own disciplinary explanations. 
Modernisation theorists identified an institutional gap created by the difference between social 
mobilisation and participation (cf. Sangmpam 2007); education economists highlighted the human 
capital deficit (cf. Hanushek 2013); and scholars of science and technology noted the existence of a 
knowledge and technology gap (cf. Cherlet 2014). An ‘interventionist paradigm’ (Reusse 2002: 6-7), 
which interpreted the task of development agencies as gap-filling, became dominant in the thinking 
about development and aid. 
 
The most recent incarnation of the thinking about development aid has been shaped by the World 
Bank, which was the driving force behind the so-called Washington Consensus and Post-Washington 
Consensus. Both emphasised the role of the market in development. While the Washington Consensus 
was aimed at eliminating the state in the development process through liberalisation, privatisation and 
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deregulation, the Post-Washington Consensus stressed the building of institutions for markets under 
the guidance of a regulatory state (Williamson 1993, World Bank 2001). 
 
Practices in development2 
 
Development professionals are the day-to-day shapers and implementers of policies that are devised 
against the background of the paradigmatic divide between strands of development thinking. 
Interpretations of aid practices have stressed that development practitioners operate as an ‘epistemic 
community’, a ‘network of professionals with recognized experience and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ 
(Haas 1992: 3). Their world is one of ‘travelling rationalities’ (Mosse 2011: 3) or even ‘travelling 
orthodoxies’, where ‘development policy remains resolutely optimistic about the power of its favoured 
approaches and institutional solutions, overplaying the impact and blurring the distinction between 
normative representations and actual outcomes’ (Mosse 2011: 7). 
 
Development professionals are generally motivated to improve the lives of people in poorer countries, 
and wish to contribute to poverty reduction or eradication. They share a set of understandings of and 
values about development, acquired as part of their (academic) training. Yet, they work in agencies 
that are subjected to a principal-agent logic (Killick 1997, Gibson et al. 2005: 43-44). The agencies, 
who are the ‘agents’ of policy implementation, may have preferences that differ from those of their 
‘principals’ (ministers or senior civil servants at the helm of a department). Typically, development 
agencies are interested in maintaining their budget, while their principals may be more concerned 
about the efficient implementation of aid programmes or the avoidance of risks. 
 
Development agencies are operating in complex and risk-prone environments, where development 
outcomes depend on many different factors beyond their control. The agencies have great difficulty in 
measuring their organisational outputs and the performance of their staff. For this reason, staff 
assessments rely on the success in disbursing allocated aid funds (the practice of ‘moving money’ as 
described by Easterly 2002: 228), the quality of project and programme management, and the 
production of reports and memorandums (Carlsson et al. 1994: 5, Gibson et al. 2005: 134-35, 154-56). 
Evaluations are common features of the cycle of aid projects and programmes, but they take much 
time in preparing and their conclusions tend to get published long after the end of the evaluated 
activities so that their contribution to learning is quite limited (Gibson et al. 2005: 151-54). 
 
The fact that development agencies assess staff mainly based on observable outputs has generated a 
technical outlook on development, where bureaucratic measurements take precedence over 
engagement with the local situation in the aid-recipient countries (cf. Eyben 2011: 153-56). Although 
 5 
 
staff of the aid agencies realise that the political realities in target countries have an important 
influence on the impact of their programmes, the ‘institutional ethos’ of their organisation leads them 
to focus on narrow development targets rather than broader social transformation (Unsworth 
2009:890). 
 
The sense of a continuing crisis in the development project, epitomised by the persistence of poverty 
despite the spending of billions on aid, has led the donor community to embrace the notion of ‘aid 
effectiveness’. With the accompanying trend of ‘managing for results’, which is an important 
component of New Public Management, the adoption of the aid effectiveness agenda has induced aid 
agencies to specify what results they are achieving with the national aid budget (cf. Cooke and Dar 
2008, Gulrajani 2011). A prime example of this trend has been the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), which specifies its objectives in the so-called Single Departmental Plan 
(Department for International Development 2015). DFID’s report to Parliament 2015-2016 provided a 
quantitative estimate of how many people were supported by DFID’s assistance across eight sectors: 
wealth creation; poverty, vulnerability, nutrition and hunger; education; health; water, sanitation and 
hygiene; governance and security; humanitarian assistance; and climate change (Department for 
International Development 2016: 5). 
 
The technocratic outlook in the epistemic community of aid practitioners leads them to focus on how 
immediate problems with aid delivery can be remedied (learning about crisis) rather than reflect on 
what are the more fundamental causes of the legitimacy crisis of development aid (learning from 
crisis). Over the past decades, learning about the crisis of aid has resulted in two responses: expansion 
and connection. The first response has led to attempts to expand the agenda beyond a narrow 
understanding of aid, by getting away from projects targeting concrete development outcomes. The 
second element has been to connect the goals of development policy to other policy priorities, in order 
to make aid more palatable to popular constituencies. 
 
Expansion and Connection of the Aid Agenda 
 
Learning from the crisis of the 1990s 
The mid-1990s were, in many respects, a high point in the permanent legitimacy crisis of development 
aid. As a first sign of this crisis, spending on development assistance by donor countries and 
multilateral agencies experienced a decrease in real terms as of 1992, and reached the 1990 level again 
only in 2003 (see figure 1). Next to this, the World Bank, which had been at the vanguard of the 
Western development project since the end of World War II, came under increasing attack because it 
had become obvious that its development precepts, rolled out over the developing world since the oil 
crisis of the late 1970s, had not worked. On the contrary, a decade and a half of structural adjustment 
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policies, implemented as part of the Washington Consensus, had resulted in increased poverty in many 
countries across the global South. The most obvious challenge to the World Bank was the ‘50 Years is 
Enough’ campaign, which was a protest movement of a great number of international NGOs against 
the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions. Targeting the annual meeting of the Boards of 
Governors of the World Bank and IMF in Madrid in 1994, the campaign questioned the legitimacy of 
the policies implemented by the two international financial institutions, and resulted in a clear sense of 
crisis at these institutions (Fox and Brown 1998: 7-9). 
 
Both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank 
demonstrated their ability to learn from the crisis of development aid experienced in the 1990s (Jessop 
2015: 257) by contributing to a paradigmatic change in development assistance policy. The new 
mantra that was introduced by the two organisations emphasised poverty reduction and aid 
effectiveness. The attention to poverty reduction took the place of economic growth, as it was 
recognised that ‘the complexity and diversity of growth experiences are not amenable to simplistic 
policy prescriptions’ (World Bank 2005: xiii). In his first year as President of the World Bank, James 
Wolfensohn called for ‘a broader, more integrated approach to development – a new paradigm, if you 
will’. To this he added that ‘[p]overty reduction remains at the heart of everything we do’ 
(Wolfensohn 2005: 51). The emphasis on aid effectiveness was an attempt to offer an alternative for 
the output-oriented focus that had characterised much of the aid agenda since the adoption of the 0.7 
per cent target for official development assistance by the United Nations General Assembly in 1970. 
Thus, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) started to stress the need for a results 
orientation in development assistance (Development Assistance Committee 1996: 2-3). 
 
Figure 1: Official development assistance from OECD to developing countries, 1980-2016 
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Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2017b) 
 
The two elements of the revised approach to aid were expressed in two key policy initiatives: the DAC 
Ministers’ statement on Development Partnerships in the New Global Context (Development 
Assistance Committee 1996: 19-20) and the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework 
(Wolfensohn 1999). The DAC Ministers adopted the report Shaping the 21st Century, which had a set 
of international development targets at its core that were to become the basis for the Millennium 
Development Goals. In doing so, the DAC Ministers chose to expand the development agenda to 
include explicitly agendas on social protection and sustainable development, which would go beyond 
traditional development targets. The report formulated the following targets for development 
assistance policies that would need to be reached by 2015 (Development Assistance Committee 1996: 
9-11): 
 
 Reduce extreme poverty by one-half; 
 Achieve universal primary education and gender equality (by eliminating gender disparity in 
primary and secondary education), improve basic health care (to reduce infant, child and 
maternal mortality) and create universal access to reproductive health services; and 
 Implement national policies for sustainable development. 
 
The tools for achieving the new international development targets also demonstrate the expansion of 
the development assistance agenda beyond traditional donor-recipient interactions. Shaping the 21st 
Century introduced ‘ownership’ as a key principle for aid delivery: development programmes should 
henceforth be based on ‘agreement and commitment from developing country partners, through their 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
O
D
A
 i
n
 U
S
$
 m
il
li
o
n
s 
(2
0
1
5
 c
o
n
st
an
t 
p
ri
ce
s)
 8 
 
own national goals and locally-owned strategies’ (Development Assistance Committee 1996: 9). 
Further, the DAC Ministers argued that the broader context of aid would require that ‘development co-
operation and other policies must work together’ and that external development partners must 
coordinate their activities among each other (Development Assistance Committee 1996: 14-15). 
 
The Comprehensive Development Framework, which the World Bank adopted during Wolfensohn’s 
term as President, contributed to the expansion of the aid agenda. As Wolfensohn put it in a speech to 
the World Bank’s Board of Governors in 1998, ‘While focusing on the macroeconomic numbers or on 
major reforms like privatization, we have ignored the basic institutional infrastructure, without which 
a market economy simply cannot function. … Too often we have focused too much on the economics, 
without a sufficient understanding of the social, the political, the environmental, and the cultural 
aspects of development’ (Wolfensohn 2005: 115). The framework that Wolfensohn (2005: 116) 
advocated is illustrative of the expansion of the development assistance agenda. It included a focus on 
five distinctive elements: a ‘good governance’ agenda, targeting transparency, voice, anti-corruption 
and government effectiveness; the regulatory framework of a market economy, including property 
rights, competition law and legal protection; social policies focused on inclusion in sectors such as 
health and education; public services and infrastructure; and policies for environmental sustainability. 
 
A very important addition, and in many senses a catalyst in terms of agenda-setting, was the work 
done on aid effectiveness at the World Bank’s Development Research Group, led by staff such as 
David Dollar and Lant Pritchett (see World Bank 1998). The World Bank’s Chief Economist at the 
time, Joseph E. Stiglitz, was very clear about the intention of the Bank’s key publication on the issue: 
 
Foreign aid is as much about knowledge as it is about money. Helping countries and 
communities generate the knowledge that they need for development is a prime role of 
assistance. And aid itself is a learning business that continually evolves as lessons of success 
and failure become clear. Assessing Aid is a contribution to this ongoing learning process. It 
aims to contribute to a larger ‘rethinking of aid’ that the international community is engaged 
in – a rethinking in two senses. First, with the end of the cold war, there is a group that is 
‘rethinking aid’ in the sense of questioning its very existence in a world of integrated capital 
markets. In response to this trend, we show that there remains a role for financial transfers 
from rich countries to poor ones. Second, developing and developed nations alike are 
reconceptualizing the role of assistance in light of a new development paradigm. Effective aid 
supports institutional development and policy reforms that are at the heart of successful 
development. (World Bank 1998: ix, italics added) 
 
 9 
 
The ‘powerful narrative’ that resulted from the World Bank’s Development Research Group (Court 
and Maxwell 2005: 721) was summarised in the conclusion that ‘aid works’ (World Bank 1998: 2). 
This conclusion was taken up very quickly in the epistemic community of professionals working on 
development assistance (cf. the examples mentioned in Hout 2007). According to a former Director 
General at the UK’s Department for International Development, it was crucial that ‘the story line was 
presented simply and clearly: move to the poverty efficient aid allocation model by supporting 
countries where people were poorer and where good policies ensured better returns on the aid dollar’ 
(Ahmed 2005: 767). Apart from pointing out the World Bank’s success in promoting the lessons on 
aid selectivity drawn from the research by Dollar and his team, Ahmed (2005: 767) argued that the 
researchers were highly motivated to get their lessons across within the donor community: ‘it was 
clear that their objective was not simply to add to the stock of human knowledge about aid 
effectiveness, it was to change the way aid was allocated in practice’. The success of the new narrative 
that ‘aid that works’ implied that the aid agenda had been connected effectively to the neo-
institutionalist agenda of the Post-Washington Consensus, whose main protagonist was Joseph Stiglitz 
(see Stiglitz 1998). 
 
The DAC and World Bank’s initiatives coalesced ultimately into the main initiative of the global 
development community, the Millennium Development Goals, which were contained in the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration of September 2000 (United Nations General Assembly 2000), and 
took on board notions of governance-based aid selectivity. The Millennium Declaration expanded the 
development assistance agenda by specifying a series of broad-based objectives across seven 
elements: peace, security and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; protecting our 
common environment; human rights, democracy and good governance; protecting the vulnerable; 
meeting the special needs of Africa; and strengthening the United Nations. The MDG agenda revolved 
around eight operational targets, to be achieved by 2015, in most cases taking the situation in 1990 as 
a benchmark (United Nations 2017): 
 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (halve the proportion of people in extreme poverty; 
achieve full employment and decent work; and halve the proportion of people suffering from 
hunger); 
2. Achieve universal primary education; 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women (by eliminating gender disparity in education); 
4. Reduce child mortality; 
5. Improve maternal health (reduce maternal mortality by three quarters; and achieve universal 
access to reproductive health); 
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6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS; 
achieve universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment; and halt and reverse the incidence of malaria 
and other major diseases); 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability (integrate principles of sustainable development into 
country policies and reverse the loss of environmental resources; reduce biodiversity loss; 
halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation; and 
improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers); and 
8. Develop a global partnership for development (develop and open and non-discriminatory 
trading and financial system; address the needs of least developed and landlocked countries 
and small island developing states; deal with the debt problems of developing countries; 
provide access to affordable drugs in developing countries; and make available benefits of 
new technologies). 
 
Learning from the MDG experience 
 
The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals seems to have served the purpose of the 
international development aid community to get development higher on the political agenda. As is 
evident from Figure 1, the overall level of official development assistance from OECD member 
countries more than doubled in real terms between 2000 and 2016. The MDGs also seem to have 
instilled new dynamism among politicians and leading civil servants, witness the attention given to a 
series of high-level meetings following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). The Accra 
Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011) 
were agreed as follow-up to the Paris Declaration and, since the meeting in Busan, the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) has served as a platform for 
discussions among representatives from governments, business, private foundations and civil society. 
Since 2011, the GPEDC has held high-level meetings in Mexico (2014) and Nairobi (2017). 
 
When judged on its own merits, as documented in the UN’s final report on the implementation of the 
MDGs, the MDG project seems to have achieved good results.3 Yet, the report concluded:  
 
Despite enormous progress, even today, about 800 million people still live in extreme poverty 
and suffer from hunger. Over 160 million children under age five have inadequate height for 
their age due to insufficient food. Currently, 57 million children of primary school age are not 
in school. Almost half of global workers are still working in vulnerable conditions, rarely 
enjoying the benefits associated with decent work. About 16,000 children die each day before 
celebrating their fifth birthday, mostly from preventable causes. The maternal mortality ratio 
in the developing regions is 14 times higher than in the developed regions. Just half of 
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pregnant women in the developing regions receive the recommended minimum of four 
antenatal care visits. Only an estimated 36 per cent of the 31.5 million people living with HIV 
in the developing regions were receiving ART in 2013. In 2015, one in three people (2.4 
billion) still use unimproved sanitation facilities, including 946 million people who still 
practise open defecation. Today over 880 million people are estimated to be living in slum-
like conditions in the developing world’s cities. (United Nations 2015: 8-9) 
 
The UN’s MDG report can be interpreted as a political attempt to provide a discursively selective 
reinterpretation (see Jessop 2015: 257) of the gains made between 2000 and 2015. The return to the 
crisis rhetoric seems to have been useful in legitimising the search for a follow-up to the MDG project, 
as a way of stressing that the MDGs were unfinished business, and a new phase was necessary to 
continue addressing the development crisis. 
 
Already in 2011, four years before the end date of the MDG project, UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki 
Moon established the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda. In its 
report, the task team pointed to several trends that characterise the persistent development crisis: the 
growth of global inequalities in income, wealth and knowledge; the continuing pressure on food, land, 
health and education systems as a consequence of continuing population growth; environmental 
degradation and natural disasters; conflict and insecurity; and deficits of governance and 
accountability (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda 2012: 12-19). The 
task team’s conclusion was that, ‘Going forward, greater interdependence among countries and the 
global challenges ahead will require a truly global agenda for development, with shared 
responsibilities by all countries’ (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda 
2012: 19). This approach is clearly in line with the type of learning that was described above: the task 
team attempted to expand the agenda to include issues apart from aid, and connect the development 
agenda to issues of sustainability, conflict and governance. 
 
The outcome of the discussion on the post-2015 agenda was the embrace of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) as successors to the MDGs. The SDGs comprise 17 broad goals and 169 
targets. Next to focusing on the objectives that were already included in the MDGs, such as those 
related to poverty, hunger, decent work, education, health and sustainable development, the SDGs also 
concern access to energy, the reduction of inequalities, use of the oceans and seas, as well as peace, 
justice and strong institutions (United Nations 2016). The preamble of the General Assembly’s 
resolution on the so-called 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development illustrates the expansive nature 
of the SDGs, as well as the attempt to connect development goals to objectives in other domains. In 
the first place, the preamble indicates that the SDGs are meant to be global and universal: ‘All 
countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan.’ Next, the 
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preamble connects ‘sustainable development’ across many policy domains, by specifying that the 
SDGs ‘are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development; the 
economic, social and environmental’ (United Nations General Assembly 2015). 
 
The response embodied in the adoption of the SDGs has expanded the development agenda almost 
beyond recognition. As the quote from the preamble to Agenda 2030 makes clear, the responsibility 
for implementation of the agenda has been spread over ‘all countries and all stakeholders’. Making 
‘all’ responsible for action may amount to making no one clearly accountable. Diffusing 
responsibilities may easily give rise to collective action problems. The risk of making ‘all’ responsible 
is that the inevitably political nature of decision making on which countries and groups should 
contribute most to realising the SDGs has been obscured. Further, the ‘solution’ of connecting the 
development goals to the fundamental transformation of the economic, social and environmental 
system, has made the SDG agenda so broad that it is difficult to see how specific responsibilities 
towards developing countries should be implemented. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter discussed some changes in the international development agenda that were introduced 
since the mid-1990s. It argued that development aid has been permeated by a sense of crisis, which is 
the consequence of the very nature of the project’s agenda. The main objectives of the project, which 
are understood in terms of improvements in the quality of life of the world’s poor and disadvantage, 
are not easily achievable, and often appear to be receding as real achievements are being reported. 
 
The awareness of the crisis of development assistance has led to a dual approach. On the one hand, the 
aid agenda has been expanded to practices and approaches that go beyond the narrow understanding of 
development assistance. On the other hand, the response to the feelings of crisis resulted in connecting 
development objectives to policy priorities in other domains. 
 
Over time, the development industry has shown clear practices of learning about the legitimacy crisis 
affecting aid. This form of learning has focused on the symptoms rather than the deeper causes of the 
legitimacy crisis. One domain-specific response to the sense of crisis is manifested in the search for 
new and successful narratives. Over the past two decades, the narratives have tended to focus on 
seemingly ‘new’ development goals. Thus, the rediscovery of poverty in the mid-1990s led to the 
focus of the MDGs on objectives related to social protection. The awareness of increasing problems of 
environmental sustainability and biodiversity resulted in the addition of a wide range of objectives as 
part of the SDG agenda. The expansion of the development agenda and its connection to other policy 
priorities seems to have produced a narrative that was successful in the short run, witness for instance 
 13 
 
the Make Poverty History campaign that mobilised millions of people in 2005 (cf. Harrison 2010). 
While this way of learning about crisis may solve immediate issues related to the perceived legitimacy 
of aid, it does not address more fundamental causes related to the persistence of global poverty, which 
are related to the power differences characterising international political and economic relations. 
 
The technocratic orientation of the epistemic community of development professionals has limited its 
reflexive potential. The focus on short-term solutions (expressed in the learning about crisis) seems to 
stand in the way of more fundamental reflection, which would be the prerequisite to systemic learning 
from crisis. The introduction of new global development narratives – embedded in the MDGs for the 
2000-2015 period, and the SDGs for 2015-2030 – may have been a proper response to the scepticism 
about aid at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Given the limited attention to the structural 
barriers to reform of the international trade and financial system, it is unlikely that such initiatives may 
offer a long-run solution for the legitimacy crisis of aid.
 
Endnotes 
 
1 A well-documented case was the corruption scandal involving the Office of the Prime 
Minister of Uganda in 2012. Budget support was suspended in response to allegations about 
the misuse of funds that were allocated to support post-war reconstruction of Northern 
Uganda (The Guardian, 16 November 2012). Compared to previous years, the total of official 
development assistance provided to Uganda was somewhat lower in 2012 and 2013, but 
returned to its previous level in 2014 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2017a). 
2 Parts of this section draw on Hutchison et al. (2014: chapter 3). 
3 The analysis of the effects of globalisation by Milanovic (2016: 11) have shown, however, 
that there are huge global inequalities in gains in real per capita income since the late 1980s. 
Moreover, the analysis of Fukuda-Parr et al. (2014: 5) of the ‘power of numbers’ of the 
MDGs show that, although the MDG project appears to have generated much attention to 
certain development issues, the framing of the goals has had unintended consequences of 
simplification and support for technocratic strategies, which meant a reversion in 
development thinking away from more human-development oriented approaches. 
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